He flew too close to the sun
Why Prabhakaran became so concerned about SAARC all of a sudden and declared a unilateral ceasefire must now be clear to one and all, given the damage the LTTE has suffered during the past few days. That he could have avoided that, had the government agreed to his truce, is clear.
In the past, he had managed to lure governments into truce traps and make them fight war according to his timetable. When he wanted war, he waged it and when he wanted time to regroup and rearm, he sued for peace. Thus, the conflict came to be punctuated by ceasefires at almost regular intervals, as we argued the other day.
By 2006, Prabhakaran had taken delivery of nearly a dozen shiploads of arms under the cover of a ceasefire, according to his erstwhile commander Karuna. Confident that he had enough firepower and cadres, a ceasefire-weary Prabhakaran threw down the gauntlet at Mavil Aru.
Prabhakaran may have expected the government to stop at fighting for Mavil Aru, as had been the case earlier on, so that he could drive the army away. But, that move proved to be a huge military miscalculation on his part. He let the genie out of the bottle.
Today, the LTTE is doing exactly what the army did in 1999 and 2000 in the North-running for dear life. In 1999, a series of LTTE offensives launched with the help of newly acquired small MBRLs, among other things, were so intense that the army vacated places like Oddusudan, Nedunkerni etc. in no time. Camps were crumbling like a pack of cards and the PA government did not know how to put the brakes on the LTTE's military onslaught.
The biggest debacle came in 2000, when the army lost its sprawling military complex at Elephant Pass with its big guns. The march of the LTTE had all the trappings of a cakewalk. Prabhakaran's boys and girls reached the outskirts of Jaffna, where the army was trapped. The government did frantic shopping for arms. MBRLs were rushed from Pakistan posthaste and the Tigers stopped in their tracks.
Read more,
http://www.island.lk/2008/07/26/editorial.html
In the past, he had managed to lure governments into truce traps and make them fight war according to his timetable. When he wanted war, he waged it and when he wanted time to regroup and rearm, he sued for peace. Thus, the conflict came to be punctuated by ceasefires at almost regular intervals, as we argued the other day.
By 2006, Prabhakaran had taken delivery of nearly a dozen shiploads of arms under the cover of a ceasefire, according to his erstwhile commander Karuna. Confident that he had enough firepower and cadres, a ceasefire-weary Prabhakaran threw down the gauntlet at Mavil Aru.
Prabhakaran may have expected the government to stop at fighting for Mavil Aru, as had been the case earlier on, so that he could drive the army away. But, that move proved to be a huge military miscalculation on his part. He let the genie out of the bottle.
Today, the LTTE is doing exactly what the army did in 1999 and 2000 in the North-running for dear life. In 1999, a series of LTTE offensives launched with the help of newly acquired small MBRLs, among other things, were so intense that the army vacated places like Oddusudan, Nedunkerni etc. in no time. Camps were crumbling like a pack of cards and the PA government did not know how to put the brakes on the LTTE's military onslaught.
The biggest debacle came in 2000, when the army lost its sprawling military complex at Elephant Pass with its big guns. The march of the LTTE had all the trappings of a cakewalk. Prabhakaran's boys and girls reached the outskirts of Jaffna, where the army was trapped. The government did frantic shopping for arms. MBRLs were rushed from Pakistan posthaste and the Tigers stopped in their tracks.
Read more,
http://www.island.lk/2008/07/26/editorial.html
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